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ABSTRACT Introduction: This article propose to connect two research agendas on political behavior: studies on political tolerance
and research on partisanship. Search, by connecting these two agendas, to assess the extent to which parties have become targets of
political intolerance and thereby to assess the intensity of negative attitudes towards this central institution of democracy. Studies on
partisanship conflicts in Brazil have focused on the antagonism opposing petismo and antipetismo. However, the 2018 elections have
shown that Brazilians also adopt other forms of antipartisanship. Changes in patterns of political and electoral behavior in recent years
can only be properly understood if we consider variation over time in the intensity and scope of antipartisan sentiment. We propose a
typology where antipartisanship may be moderate or radical and may have a narrower or broader target. This theme is significant not
only for interpreting Brazil’s current political context, but also for deepening understanding of theoretical and analytical questions.
Our understanding is that these different types of antipartisanship are distinct phenomena with different effects. Materials and
Methods: The data we use to construct the proposed typology and analyze the range and intensity of antipartisanship are derived from
an unprecedented Latin America Public Opinion Project initiative to measure political tolerance in Brazil, in its 2017 edition. Our
methodology combine variables of disaffection and political intolerance to construct different voter profiles, based on respondent’s at-
titudes towards unpopular groups, including political parties. After constructing the typology, we propose regression models to esti-
mate the effects of each type on several attitudes, like support to democracy and institutional trust. Results: Our findings show a
relationship between the most extreme types of antipartisanship and attitudes towards democracy. Compared with non-antipartisan
voters, intolerant antipartisan are less supportive of democracy and democratic institutions and less favorable to freedom of expression
and the granting of political rights to minorities. The intensity of antipartisanship matters more than its scope, since the models show
that, there is little difference in the degree of commitment to democracy and democratic principles between the two types of intolerant
antipartisans, regardless of the scope of the target of their disapproval. This means that attitudes toward democracy, democratic insti-
tutions, and democratic principles depend less on the scope antipartisanship, than on political intolerance towards these groups. Dis-
cussion: The data and results presented here indicate that antipartisanship is not a one-dimensional phenomenon. The individual is
not merely antipartisan or non-antipartisan. We show that antipartisanship contains at least two dimensions: its scope and intensity.
Previous studies have already shown the existence of different expressions of antipartisanship, but this diversity has not yet been sys-
tematically explored using a well-defined typology. Our work points to this research agenda.
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I. Introduction
P
olarization in Brazilian politics has expanded beyond the bounds of the
political elite in the form of demonstrations and protests that, since 2013,
have seen hundreds of thousands of people take to the streets. Common at
such events have been chants, posters and banners that express intolerant politi-
cal attitudes. In some cases, such intolerance has manifested in physical vio-
lence, even leading to the construction of a security wall to separate groups
supportive of and opposed to the government at the time of the votes on the ad-
missibility of the president’s impeachment process in the Chamber of Deputies
and the Senate. The recent context of a hostile election contest in 2018 accentu-
ated the antagonism between opposing political camps.
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This context forces us to think about the effects of political intolerance on
Brazil’s young democracy, especially on freedom of expression and the coexis-
tence of a plurality of political projects. This article addresses a specific mani-
festation of this phenomenon: intolerance of political parties in Brazil.
In this sense, we propose to connect two research agendas on political be-
havior that remain isolated: studies on political tolerance and research on parti-
sanship. On the one hand, investigations by the first group have focused on what
we call nonconformist groups (communists, racist, atheists, among others), fo-
cusing on how public opinion positions itself regarding their fundamental polit-
ical rights. To date, this literature has not included among the targets of
intolerance political parties’ activists. On the other hand, studies of partisanship
have used measures of affiliation or feelings that do not tap extreme negative at-
titudes, as the denial of the political rights for political party and their members.
Our intention is, by connecting these two agendas, to assess the extent to which
parties have become targets of political intolerance and thereby to assess the in-
tensity of negative feelings or attitudes towards this central institution of de-
mocracy.
Studies of conflicts at the level of broad attitudes in Brazil have focused on
the antagonism that opposes petismo – support of the Partido dos Traba-
lhadores (Workers’ Party, PT) – and antipetismo, or opposition to the PT. How-
ever, the 2018 elections have shown that Brazilians also adopt other forms of
antipartisanship. Obviously, this does not mean that antipetismo has lost rele-
vance. On the contrary, it was one of the main driving forces of the vote and de-
cisive for the electoral result. But the victory of Jair Bolsonaro of the Partido
Social Liberal (Social Liberal Party, PSL), on an far-right ideological platform,
can only be adequately explained by a combination of antipetismo and rejection
of other conventional parties, especially the Partido da Social Democracia
Brasileira (Brazilian Party of Social Democracy, PSDB). Moreover, changes in
patterns of political and electoral behavior in recent years can only be properly
understood if we consider variation over time in the intensity and scope of
antipartisan sentiment.
However, little is known about the different expressions of antipartisanship
in Brazil, which can range from antipathy to one party to a desire to eliminate all
parties from the political system. To fill this lacuna, we propose a typology of
antipartisanship and examine the differences between the different types in
terms of their attitudinal underpinnings. According to the typology we propose,
antipartisanship may be moderate or radical and may have a narrower or
broader target. This theme is significant not only for interpreting Brazil’s cur-
rent political context, but also for deepening understanding of theoretical and
analytical questions. Our understanding is that these different types of anti-
partisanship are distinct phenomena with different effects.
Tolerant antipartisanship has been the main focus of national and interna-
tional literature, with the rejection of parties used as a measure. The most ex-
treme form of antipartisanship, whose most distinctive feature is political
intolerance, has not yet been systematically investigated. In our view, radical
antipartisanship, whether it has a narrow or broad focus, is one of the main fac-
tors driving political conflicts at the level of mass behavior in Brazil today, ulti-
mately leading to Bolsonaro’s successful rise to the Presidency of the Republic.
Because of its relevance to Brazilian political life and the fact that it has not yet
been studied, we primarily focus on this type of antipartisanship.
As already noted, our model distinguishes different types of antipartisanship
according to their comprehensiveness. While the few existing studies on the
subject in Brazil deal with antipartisanship as rejection of one specific party (the
PT), our research also considers the broader rejection of parties (Poguntke,
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1996; Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996; Torcal et al., 2002), which we expect to be
correlated with distinctive attitudinal and behavioural patterns.
Another difference between our study and conventional studies of anti-
partisanship is that our focus is not on parties as institutions, but on partisans,
that is, those identified as supporters of parties. The standard procedure for
gauging negative feelings towards parties is to use variables that measure disaf-
fection towards them. There is no doubt that this is a strong predictor of voting
behavior. But when the goal is to measure attitudes favorable to the political ex-
clusion of groups, such as those who identify with or are activists for a given
party, political tolerance is a more appropriate measure.
This type of antipartisanship, characterized by “us versus them”, has been
discussed in studies on group identity. In addition to explaining the vote, this
high-intensity antipartisanship that targets partisan groups is more adequate for
explaining social mobilization, including public demonstrations and confronta-
tion in the streets. To analyze extreme antipartisanship, we engage with the lit-
erature on political tolerance, which has not previously been included in studies
of negative partisanship.
The article is structured in five sections, after this introduction (I). In the sec-
ond part, we present a brief review of the literature on antipartisanship and iden-
tify the lacuna that we seek to fill. In the third section, we provide information
about the empirical material and methodological procedures of our study, and
present a typology for studying antipartisanship in the Brazilian context. In the
fourth section we present the results using models to estimate attitudinal effects
of antipartisanship, especially in its most extreme version. In section five, we
discuss these results, and in our Conclusion (VI), we return to the article’s
opening discussion.
II. Party sentiments: partisanship and antipartisanship
As early as 1960, the authors of “The American Voter” (Campbell et al.,
1960) argued that, in addition to party identification, a phenomenon related to
negative partisanship could also be observed within the electorate. One of the
pillars of this foundational work in political behavior studies (Dalton & Klin-
gemann, 2007) lies in the theory of reference groups in social psychology,
which had already developed the notion of ??negative reference groups, later
developed in studies based on social identity theory (Mayer, 2017; Iyengar et
al., 2012; McGregor et al., 2015; Medeiros & Noël, 2014; Samuels & Zucco,
2018; Freire et al., 2017).
However, in the dissemination of the results presented by Campbell and his
collaborators (Campbell et al., 1960), the role of negative partisanship tended to
be overlooked. When the literature addressed negative party sentiment it was in
order to explain the different patterns of behavior among supporters vis-à-vis
the opposing party (Almond & Verba, 1989), more closely linked to the theme
of polarization between partisan voters than antipartisanship per se.
The presumed universality of the theories that “most Americans have an af-
fective bond with a party” (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 121) and that party identifi-
cation is one of the key factors determining elections only began to be ques-
tioned in the 1980s, as political parties and electoral turnouts notably declined
(Wattenberg, 1984). If, in studies on party decline, the central question ad-
dressed was the growth in voter apathy, the ensuing debate on antipartisanship
focused on the formation of negative attitudes toward such institutions.
At least since the 1990s, the concept of antipartisanship has been studied as a
phenomenon that is constitutive of political dynamics (Poguntke, 1996; Pogun-
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tke & Scarrow, 1996). As a result, in the last twenty years, studies on electoral
behavior have consolidated around the view that parties are not only a pole of
attraction for voters, but also an object of rejection.
The antipartisanship debate gained prominence when its effects became
more visible with the rise of the ‘new right’ in Europe during the 1990s
(Poguntke, 1996). The studies are divided between, on one side, a culturalist ap-
proach, focusing on antisystemic attitudes, their causes and consequences
(Poguntke, 1996; Poguntke & Scarrow,1996; Torcal et al., 2002) and, on the
other, the study of negative partisanship as a new development within the field
of partisanship (Mayer, 2017; McGregor et al., 2015; Medeiros & Noël, 2014).
The first approach considers the target of antipartisanship as of parties col-
lectively, whether this denotes actually existing parties or political parties as an
institution. This tolerant antipartisanship is a more stable attitude and entails op-
position to one of the principles of representative democracy: partisan competi-
tion (Dahl, 1997). As a consequence, antipartisanship, especially that which re-
jects parties per se, can contribute to the emergence of neopopulism, to a decline
in support for democratic regimes and to anti-systemic patterns of behavior
(Schedler 1996, especially in contexts where political parties have historically
been fragile, as is the case in Latin American countries (Yebra, 1998).
Torcal et al. (2002) show that, at least in the southern European countries, it
is those who are younger, less educated, and politically disaffected (Torcal et
al., 2002) that hold more negative attitudes toward parties, constituting what
they call cultural antipartisanship. The central argument of the authors is that
cultural antipartisanship is part of a broader condition of apathy and political
disaffection that leads to broad social sectors becoming detached from politics.
The second approach in the study of antipartisanship lies within the scope of
partisanship itself, focusing on individual’s aversion to the party opposing that
which they identify. This approach is theoretically grounded in social identity
theory, according to which negative attitudes towards the opposing group are a
constituent element of the group identity itself (McGregor et al., 2015). That is
to say, identification with a party is accompanied by rejection of the parties
against which it competes.
More concerned with the role of the parties in explaining electoral behavior
than with broader attitudes toward the political system and its consequences for
democratic regimes, the key concept of these studies is “negative partisanship”.
Not surprisingly, studies that follow this line understand that the target of nega-
tive partisanship is the party for which the individual would never vote (Rose &
Mishler, 1998; Medeiros & Noel, 2014; Garry, 2007).
The literature has little to say about different types of antipartisanship. There
are few works that elaborate theories and typologies capable of explaining the
ways in which the phenomenon varies. As we have seen, studies that follow a
more culturalist line divide antipartisans between those who reject “actually ex-
isting” parties and those who reject the very existence of parties.
In this tradition of studies on party identification, the tendency is to contrast
two types of partisanship: positive and negative. This means that no effort is
made in this field to distinguish between different types of antipartisanship.
Even models that propose to go beyond a binary typology do not escape this du-
ality. Rose & Mishler (1998), for example, present a more general typology of
partisanship, according to which a negative partisan is a voter who has no party
identity but who would not, under any circumstances, vote for a particular party.
The difference between the negative partisan and partisan voters is that the latter
identify with one party, regardless of whether they have a negative identifica-
tion with another party.
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In Brazil, the notion of negative partisanship initially arose in the study of
Almeida (1996) and has been further developed in subsequent studies by
Carreirão & Kinzo (2004) and Carreirão & Barbetta (2004), Carreirão (2007a;
2007b; 2008), Ribeiro, Carreirão & Borba (2011; 2016), Neves (2012), and
Samuels & Zucco (2015). To summarize, these studies argue that the negative
attitudes Brazilians hold towards political parties are as important as positive
ones, especially in the way they structure voting patterns.
On the other hand, such attitudes bear little relation to the views voters hold
on key issues, such as the role of the state in the economy, and their broader po-
litical attitudes, such as their commitment to democracy. However, some stud-
ies, although confirming the dominant homogeneous pattern of partisan and
antipartisan political positions and attitudes, point to the existence of statisti-
cally significant differences between petistas and antipetistas in relation to
affirmative action policies (Zucco & Samuels, 2015) and in support of democ-
racy, political tolerance and the desirability of social change (Samuels & Zucco,
2018).
Subsequent works focusing on the polarization debate supported the conclu-
sion that there are few differences between antipetistas and psdbistas (Borges &
Vidigal, 2018), both in terms of ideology and social profile. Following this rea-
soning, political polarization in Brazil is basically affective in nature (Freire et
al., 2017).
In situating negative partisanship in Brazilian within the international litera-
ture on antipartisanship, Samuels & Zucco (2018) take an important step to-
wards establishing a model capable of going beyond the petismo vs antipetismo
dualism. According to the authors, the growth of antipartisanship between 1998
to 2016, rising from 15.7 to 23.9%, made Brazil the country with the highest
percentage of antipartisans.
The authors consider as antipartisan those voters who have no party identifi-
cation and reject at least one party. Although the starting point is different, the
point of arrival is essentially the same: in Brazil, antipartisanship is practically
synonymous with antipetismo.
But is antipartisanship in fact concentrated solely the PT? The authors them-
selves note that in Brazil, only 40% of antipartisans target only one specific
party. Furthermore, according to Samuels & Zucco (2018), Brazil is today the
country in which antipartisans opposed to just one party represent the smallest
percentage of the total number of antipartisans. Similarly, Paiva et al. (2016)
show that the PT does not stand out as a target of negative partisanship. They
identify a level of similar rejection “in relation to the other important parties in
the Brazilian political scenario” (Paiva et al., 2016, p. 649). The evidence avail-
able to us (Table 1) also shows that antipartisanship in Brazil is diffuse.
One of our aims in this article is to go beyond negative partisanship, which
focuses on an individual’s negative disposition towards a party. Although this
narrow form of antipartisanship is relevant for explaining the individual’s elec-
toral behavior (s/he probably will not vote for the party in question), it does not
help in explaining other phenomena associated with a broader rejection of polit-
ical parties, such as voters abstaining or spoiling their ballots.
Of equal if not greater importance than the scope of antipartisanship is its in-
tensity. This occurs when party rejection is accompanied by hostility (Poguntke
& Scarrow, 1996) and political intolerance. That is, when it is not only a symp-
tom of disaffection, but also of a desire to prevent parties from exercising their
political function.
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From what we have seen so far, there is one important gap in the literature on
antipartisanship: the possibility that various different types of antipartisanship
exist, varying in scope and intensity, has not yet been systematically and empiri-
cally examined. Likewise, the consequences of these different types of anti-
partisanship also have not yet received the attention they deserve. The present
article seeks to fill this lacuna, emphasizing the most extreme manifestations of
the phenomenon and the attitudes associated with them.
Substantively, our goal is to examine more closely the supposed attitudinal
homogeneity among partisans and antipartisans in Brazil. To achieve this, we
have expanded the scope of antipartisanship, both in relation to its target, ie. go-
ing beyond antipetismo, and its nature, going beyond conventional/tolerant
antipartisanship. Furthermore, we shift the focus from attitudes towards partic-
ular issues to attitudes regarding political institutions and democratic principles.
III. Data, typology and construction of variables
Shifting from the discussion of typologies to the actual measurement of
antipartisanship, we see that, similarly, few studies have invested in developing
more complex measures. Several measures of antipartisanship have been used,
from the direct question of whether respondents feel represented by parties
(Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996) to more abstract measures that seek to capture the
idea that parties are necessary to democracy (Torcal et al., 2002).
But the most often used indicators are those that measure affective disposi-
tion towards or electoral rejection of parties. McGregor and his collaborators
(McGregor et al., 2015), for example, combine these two types of measure: 1)
degree of affection/disaffection in relation to parties, using a scale going up to
100 points; 2) asking which party the individual would never vote for.
Yerba (1998) also uses a combination of two measures: one on the impor-
tance of parties to democracy (part of a series of questions inviting the respon-
dent to assign positive or negative values to a range of institutions), and the
other a partisan feeling scale (varying between -1 and 1). An antipartisan is an
individual who believes that parties are not indispensable to democracy and at-
tach a low value to parties on the scale of party affection.
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Antipetistas + Antipsdbistas 22.22
Source: Lapop, 2017.
ITo create these disaffection groups, we use the following question from LAPOP: Speak-
ing of different groups of people, could you tell how much you like or dislike those listed
below. We will now use a scale from 1 to 10, in which 1 means “strongly dislike” and 10
means “strongly like”: a) People who advocate the legalization of abortion; b) People
who defend the military regime; c) Communists; d) Petistas/PT sympathizers; e)
PSDBistas/PSDB sympathizers. Using only the last two items of the series, groups were
created based on the scale for “Petistas/PT sympathizers” and “PSDBistas/PSDB sympa-
thizers”, considering the lowest score on the scale. In cases where the respondent as-
signed the lowest score to more than one group, the tie was resolved by random designa-
tion. Additional information is presented in the methodological section.
None of these conventional measures allows us to capture the full diversity
of antipartisanship as a political phenomenon. To move in this direction, we
propose a typology based on scope and intensity, two dimensions that cover
variations in antipartisanship.
The data we use to construct the proposed typology are derived from an un-
precedented LAPOP initiative to measure political tolerance in Brazil, in its
2017 edition. As we will now explain, we propose to combine measures of dis-
affection and political intolerance to construct different voter profiles, based on
respondent’s attitudes towards unpopular groups, including political parties.
Following the general guidelines proposed by Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus
(1982), the LAPOP questionnaire presents this first set of questions in order to
identify ‘disaffected’ respondents:
Speaking of different groups of people, could you tell how much you like or
dislike those listed below. We will now use a scale from 1 to 10, in which 1
means “strongly dislike” and 10 means “strongly like”.
a) People who advocate the legalization of abortion
b) People who defend the military regime
c) Communists
d) Petistas /PT sympathizers
e) PSDBistas /PSDB sympathizers
Unlike Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982), Lapop did not ask the direct
question about which group respondents most disliked. The target group was in-
stead identified based on which received the lowest score on the scale. In cases
where the respondent assigned the lowest score to more than one group, the tie
was resolved by random designation.1 Using only the last two items of the se-
ries, groups were created based on the scale for “Petistas/PT sympathizers” and
“PSDBistas/PSDB sympathizers”.
Next, we created four possible categories based on the combination of these
two new dichotomous variables: the non-antipartisans, those who are only
antipetistas, those who are only antipsdbistas and those who reject both parties.
The following LAPOP questionnaire invites respondents to position them-
selves in relation to the political rights of their least liked groups, using the fol-
lowing question:
Speaking of the group of people you least like ..
On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means “strongly disapprove” and 10 means
“strongly approve” ..
a) How much do you approve of the right of these people to vote?
b) How much do you approve of the right of these people to speak
publicly?
c) How much do you approve of the right of these people to run for
public office?
The individual responses for these three measures were grouped into a Polit-
ical Tolerance Index (with Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85), standardized to vary be-
tween 1 and 10. We recoded this index dichotomously, considering those with
scores of up to 4, which was the threshold point of the first quartile of the data
distribution, as intolerant.
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Finally, we combine this dichotomous variable of political tolerance with
the previous measure of disapproval of groups linked to parties, generating a
classification (Table 2) with the following types2:
1) Not antipartisan = does not display disaffection towards any party.
2) Tolerant antipartisan = dislikes partisans of one party, but is not in-
tolerant.
3) Intolerant antipartisan = dislikes partisans of one party and is in-
tolerant.
4) Generalized tolerant antipartisan= dislikes partisans of both par-
ties, but is not intolerant.
5) Generalized intolerant antipartisan = dislikes partisans of both
parties and is intolerant.
The distribution of these groups within the national sample follows in
Table 3.
In this article we test two hypotheses concerning the most extreme profile,
that we call “generalized intolerant antipartisan”:
1) That generalized intolerant antipartisans hold more negative atti-
tudes towards democracy and its institutions, having less confidence in
political institutions, less support for the political system and less sup-
port for democracy;
2) That generalized intolerant antipartisans are less supportive of
democratic principles, specifically the rights of minorities (homosexu-
als) to run for political office and the right to participate in demonstra-
tions.
Our hypotheses are based on the broader argument that the type of anti-
partisanship matters. The substantive argument is that antipartisanship is not a
homogeneous phenomenon and that different types each have their own effects.
Since the relationship between the most extreme types of antipartisanship and
democratic attitudes has not yet been theorized and tested in studies of political
behavior, our hypotheses are grounded in the logical proposition that individu-
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Table 2 - Classification axes for Scope vs Intensity
Scope/Intensity Restricted Generalized
Tolerant Tolerant antipartisan Generalized tolerant antipartisan
Intolerant Intolerant antipartisan Generalized intolerantantipartisan
Source: elaborated by the authors.
Table 3 - Distribution of Types of Antipartisanship




Generalized tolerant antipartisan 13.2
Generalized intolerant antipartisan 9
Source: Lapop, 2017.
2 The term “generalized” in
our typology refers to the
disaffection towards the two
main political parties (PT and
PSDB) in Brazil at the time,
that are included in the
questionnaire. In this way, it is
an empirical limit of the work,
since a more effective measure
of “generalized anti-partyism”
would involve including the
supporters, if not all, at least of
the main Brazilian political
parties in the question about





include supporters of other
Brazilian parties as well.
Unfortunately, other relevant
political parties were not
included in this question in
Lapop’s 2017 questionnaire.
So, the term “generalized” in
our typology refers to the
disaffection towards the
groups who identify with the
two main political parties (PT
and PSDB), having together
won all the six elections from
2002 to 2014. Together these
two political parties gather
62% of the Brazilians who
identify with a party in 2017.
als hold broadly consistent attitudes towards democracy. We expect, therefore,
that individuals who do not approve of parties enjoying political rights are more
likely to express negative attitudes towards democracy and its institutions and
to democratic principles when compared to those who are tolerant.
Although the target of intolerance varies according to individuals’ ideologi-
cal profile (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1982), when intolerance is associ-
ated with the rejection of all parties, we can say that it has no ideological bias
and therefore is generalized.
In Brazil, 43% of voters (Table 3) harbor some kind of antipartisan senti-
ment. Certainly, a phenomenon of this magnitude deserves greater attention in
studies of Brazilians’ political behavior. In the next section, we offer a contribu-
tion to addressing this question. As we have already stated, and outlined in our
hypotheses, the main focus of our analysis is on more extreme antipartisans,
who not only express disaffection with partisan groups, but also disapprove of
these groups having political rights.
IV. Results
We first verified whether there were differences in the socio-demographic
profiles of the different antipartisan groups (Appendix, Table 1A). Using five
binary logistic models (in which each of the profiles was included as a depend-
ent variable), it was not possible to identify clear distinctive patterns between
the groups. Significant results point to individuals in the non-antipartisan pro-
file being older on average than those in the other four profiles. On the other
hand, tolerant antipartisans are younger and tolerant antipartisans are distin-
guished from the others by being mostly male and less educated. Finally, intol-
erant antipartisans have no attributes that distinguish them from the others. This
means that the group we focus on, the intolerant antipartisans, is evenly distrib-
uted among all segments of the electorate. This contrasts with the findings of
Torcal et al. (2002) related to cultural antipartisans in southern European coun-
tries, who were generally younger and less educated.
We now turn to the results of multivariate models that estimate the effects of
types of antipartisanship on support for democracy and for the political rights of
minorities. In the models reported below, the effects of the proposed classifica-
tion are controlled for by three sociodemographic variables: gender, age group
and education. In terms of gender, female is coded as 1. Age group is captured
through the division of the sample into three groups: up to 30 years old, from 31
to 50, and over 50. Education is measured in the number of years of formal
schooling completed. Two additional controls were also included: congressio-
nal evaluation and interest in politics. These two measures have scales of 5 and
4 points, respectively.
Here we test two types of support for democracy: adherence to the regime
and political institutions, and support for democratic principles3 (Fuks et al.,
2019). To analyze the first dimension, we present three linear models to esti-
mate the effects of the most extreme form of antipartisanship. The first has as its
dependent variable a measure of adherence to democracy, constructed on the
degree of agreement (with an original scale from 1 to 7, converted to 0 to 10)
with the following LAPOP question: “Democracy has some problems, but it is
better than any other form of government.”
The second model has as its dependent variable an index of support for the
political system, constructed by adding together three original LAPOP vari-
ables. The first is based on the question, “To what extent do you respect Brazil-
ian political institutions?” The second is built from the question, “How proud
are you of living under the Brazilian political system?” Finally, the third mea-
Antipartisanship and political tolerance in Brazil 9/18
3 Descriptive statistics for the
dependent variables are
included in Appendix, Table
2A.
sure is obtained from the question, “To what extent do you believe people
should support the Brazilian political system?” All of these were originally
coded on scale from 1 (nothing) to 7 (very), but after adding them together we
standardized it to a scale of 0 to 104.
In the third model, the response variable is an index of confidence in politi-
cal institutions, also constructed by adding together three questions asked by
LAPOP. The first asks respondents to indicate (as with the previous questions,
from 1 to 7) to what extent they trust the national congress, the second one asks
the same question about the office of the presidency, and the third, about elec-
tions. As in previous measurements, we adjusted the scale of the index to range
from 0 to 10.5
Table 46 presents the findings from our study on antipartisanship, showing
that: compared to the other groups, belonging to the generalized intolerant
group is associated with lower support for democracy. The non-antipartisan
group, for example, registers 1.22 points more on the scale, with a mean of 4.5
and a median of 5. The differential effect is similar (1.17) for tolerant anti-
partisan group and lower for generalized tolerant antipartisans (0.66). What
most stands out is the fact that there is no statistically significant difference be-
tween the two most extreme types of antipartisanship, ie. whether political in-
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Table 4 - Attitudes towards democracy and political institutions
Support for Democracy Support for the Political
System
Institutional Confidence
Generalized intolerant antipartisan Ref. Ref. Ref.
Non-antipartisan 1.22*** 1.36*** 1.42***
(0.249) (0.194) (0.175)
Tolerant antipartisan 1.17*** 0.69*** 0.64***
(0.292) (0.225) (0.205)
Intolerant antipartisan 0.3 0.38 0.52*
(0.35) (0.271) (0.247)
Generalized tolerant antipartisan 0.66* 0.41* 0.25
(0.396) (0.229) (0.207)
Evaluation of Congress -0.11 -0.64*** -0.65***
(0.067) (0.052) (0.047)
Political Interest 0.35*** 0.19*** 0.20***
(0.074) (0.057) (0.052)
Sex -0.26* -0.13 -0.20*
(0.138) (0.106) (0.097)
Age 0.48*** -0.03 -0.01
(0.094) (0.072) (0.066)
Education 1.12*** -0.06** -0.06**
(0.02) (0.016) (0.014)
Intercept 3.69*** 6.33*** 5.68***
(0.447) (0.341) (0.302)
Observations 1404 1405 1405
R2 0.094 0.199 0.245
Source: Lapop, 2017.
Obs.: VIF values below 2.0, according to the values in the Appendix, Table 3A. *p < 0.1;**p < 0.05;***p < 0.01.
4 Cronbach Alpha = 0,68.
5 Cronbach Alpha = 0,73.
6 The marginal effects of the
predictors can be seen in the
figures in the Appendix
(Graph 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A and
5A).
tolerance targets just one party or both parties. Four of the control variables
were relevant: being older, more interested in politics, and having more years of
schooling raised the score, while being female reduce the score.
The second model in Table 4 presents similar results for the first two groups,
with a distinction between non-antipartisan (1.36) and tolerant antipartisans
(0.69). In the other two groups, the relationship follows the same pattern as that
of support for democracy: there is no difference between the two intolerant
types, while the score is 0.41 higher for the generalized tolerant antipartisans. In
this model, three controls were relevant: education and evaluation of the con-
gress with a negative effect and political interest, positive.
The last model in the table indicates even greater differences between
non-partisan and tolerant antipartisans, on the one hand, and the reference cate-
gory of generalized intolerant antipartisans, on the other. Non-antipartisans
score 1.42 points higher than generalized intolerant antipartisans in terms of in-
stitutional confidence, while in the case of tolerant antipartisans, the difference
is 0.64 points. The distinction between the intolerant groups becomes statisti-
cally significant in this model, with the lower scope exhibiting greater confi-
dence (0.52), while the difference in relation to the generalized tolerant anti-
partisans disappears. Regarding the controls, this time we identified negative
effects of the evaluation of the congress, sex and education. The only measure
with a positive effect was interest.
Concerning democratic principles, we constructed two models. The first
takes a measure of political tolerance for (homosexual) minorities as a response
variable. LAPOP asks respondents to what extent they agree with the right of
homosexuals to run for public office, with responses measured on a scale of 1 to
10 points, giving a mean of 6.7 and a median of 8. The second model has as its
dependent variable a measure of the respondent’s support for the right to partic-
ipate in political demonstrations or protests, constructed using the answers
given (on a scale of 1 to 10) to the following question: “I am going to read you a
list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and ob-
jectives. Please tell me how strongly you approve or disapprove... Of people
participating in legal demonstrations. How strongly do you approve?”
The results presented in Table 5 shows that three categories differ signifi-
cantly from the reference group. Non-antipartisans are considerably more toler-
ant, with a score that is .91 higher, but this difference is even greater among the
two tolerant antipartisan groups, with scores of 1.23 and 1.78. By contrast, once
again there is no statistically significant difference of the intolerant antipartisan
compared to the generalized intolerant antipartisans. Among controls, gender,
interest and schooling have positive effects, while age has the effect of reducing
the scores.
The second model has very similar effects, but with lesser intensity: the dif-
ferential effect for non-antipartisans drops to 0.70 points; tolerant antipartisans
scored 1.11; and generalized tolerant antipartisans scored 1.37. Again, we did
not find statistically significant differences between the the two types of intoler-
ant antipartisans. The effects of the control variables go in the same direction as
those presented in model 1.
V. Discussion
Our findings show a clear relationship between the most extreme types of
antipartisanship and attitudes towards democracy. Compared with non-antipar-
tisan voters, and, more relevant to the purpose of our study, with other types of
antipartisans, generalized intolerant antipartisans are less supportive of democ-
racy and democratic institutions and less favorable to freedom of expression
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and the granting of political rights to minorities. What is striking is that the in-
tensity of antipartisanship matters more than its scope, since the models show
that, broadly speaking, there is little difference in the degree of commitment to
democracy and democratic principles between the two types of intolerant
antipartisans, regardless of the scope of the target of their disapproval (one or
two parties). This means that attitudes toward democracy, democratic institu-
tions, and democratic principles depend less on the scope of the target individ-
ual’s disapproval of groups who identify with parties, than on political
intolerance towards these groups.
The results above are in line with the findings of Torcal et al. (2002) on cul-
tural antipartisanship in the Europe, which created conditions for the emergence
and electoral growth of neopopulist parties. In the Brazilian case, intolerant
antipartisanship seems to have contributed to generating an attitudinal bases fa-
vourable to the authoritarian and morally conservative discourse that emerged
victorious from the 2018 presidential elections (Fuks, Ribeiro e Borba, 2021;
Fuks e Marques, 2020).
The data and results presented here also indicate that antipartisanship (like
partisanship) is not a one-dimensional phenomenon. The individual is not
merely antipartisan or non-antipartisan. We show that antipartisanship contains
at least two dimensions: its scope and intensity. Previous studies have already
shown the existence of different expressions of antipartisanship (Poguntke,
1996; Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996; Torcal et al., 2002; Rose & Mishler, 1998),
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Table 5 - Support for democratic principles
Political tolerance of homosexuals Support for the right to participate in
demonstrations
Generalized intolerant antipartisans Ref. Ref.
Non-antipartisans 0.91** 0.70**
(0.306) (0.271)
Tolerant antipartisans 1.23*** 1.11***
(0.362) (0.32)
Intolerant antipartisans 0.23 0.51
(0.441) (0.387)
Generalized tolerant antipartisans 1.78*** 1.37***
(0.367) (0.324)













Obs.: VIF values below 2.0, according to the values in the Appendix, Table 3A. *p < 0.1;**p < 0.05;***p < 0.01.
but this diversity has not yet been systematically explored using a well-defined
typology. Our work points to the promise of pursuing such a path.
VI. Conclusion
Antipartisanship has been visible in the dynamics of Brazilian political be-
haviour as a phenomenon that is broader than antipetismo alone since at least
2013. Having grown quietly, the rejection of the main Brazilian parties clearly
crystallized in the 2018 election, in the form of a presidential candidate who
presented himself as an alternative option, against the political parties. In this
context, studying antipartisanship, including its different types, causes and de-
velopments, is a task that has forced itself onto on the agenda of Brazilian politi-
cal science.
In general, the international and national literature on antipartisanship have
thought of it as a one-dimensional phenomenon. Here we have developed the
argument that it is in fact multidimensional and that, therefore, the first tasks are
to elaborate a typology that captures its diversity and test its validity. Our study
confirms that there are, indeed, gains to be made from analyzing antipar-
tisanship as a multidimensional phenomenon, especially in cases where nega-
tive feeling towards parties is accompanied by political intolerance. In such
cases, we are already talking about a phenomenon different to simple disaffec-
tion, which has its own dynamics.
Torcal et al. (2002) were correct in stating that, in general, the literature does
not distinguish between different types of antipartisanship, each with different
causes and consequences. According to the authors, cultural, unlike “reactive”,
antipartisanship is an attitude that tends to be stable over time, resulting from
long-term processes of socialization and experiences of low-quality democra-
cies and authoritarian regimes over extended periods.
We do not know if and to what extent the nature of the anti-systemic
antipartisanship that we examine in this article is reactive or cultural. Is it part of
a “general syndrome of apathy”, leading to the distancing of whole social sec-
tors from politics and political elites? Or is it a reaction to the irresponsible be-
havior of the political elite? What we can say is that, in its extreme versions,
antipartisanship leads to some defending the suppression of hard-won rights of
liberal democracies, such as freedom of expression and the right for minorities
to run for public office, and to the decline of democratic legitimacy, which may
have contributed to generating a favorable social environment for far-right po-
litical programs, like that on offer in the 2018 Brazilian election.
Future studies may confirm whether there is a relationship between different
types of antipartisanship and other dimensions of public opinion and political
behavior. As well as fostering anti-systemic attitudes, as we show here, does the
broader and more extreme disapproval of parties also provoke violent actions?
Can the consensus in the literature about the convergence between right and
left, and between petistas’ and antipetistas’ views on a range of key issues, such
as socioeconomic inequality and same-sex marriage, be extended to the differ-
ent types of antipartisanship? And does tolerant antipartisanship increase the
number of abstentions and spoiled ballots? Such questions are part of our future
research agenda.
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Antipartidarismo e tolerância política no Brasil
RESUMO Introdução: Este artigo se propõe a articular duas agendas de pesquisa sobre comportamento político: estudos sobre
tolerância política e partidarismo. Busca, ao conectar essas duas agendas, avaliar em que medida os partidos se tornaram alvos de
intolerância política e, assim, avaliar a intensidade de sentimentos ou atitudes negativas em relação a essas instituições centrais da
democracia. Estudos sobre conflitos entre partidários no Brasil têm enfocado no antagonismo entre petismo e antipetismo. No
entanto, as eleições de 2018 mostraram que os brasileiros também adotam outras formas de antipartidarismo. Mudanças nos padrões
de comportamento político e eleitoral nos últimos anos só podem ser adequadamente compreendidas se considerarmos a variação ao
longo do tempo na intensidade e no escopo do sentimento antipartidário. Propomos uma tipologia onde o antipartidarismo pode ser
moderado ou radical e pode ter um alvo mais restrito ou mais amplo. Esse tema é significativo não apenas para interpretar o contexto
político atual do Brasil, mas também para aprofundar a compreensão de questões teóricas e analíticas. Nosso entendimento é que ess-
es diferentes tipos de antipartidarismo são fenômenos distintos com efeitos diferentes. Materiais e métodos: Os dados que usamos
para construir a tipologia proposta e analisar o alcance e a intensidade do antipartidarismo são derivados de uma iniciativa inédita do
Projeto de Opinião Pública da América Latina para medir a tolerância política no Brasil, em sua edição de 2017. Nossa metodologia
combina variáveis de insatisfação e intolerância política para construir diferentes perfis de eleitores, com base nas atitudes dos
entrevistados em relação a grupos impopulares, incluindo partidos políticos. Após a construção da tipologia, propomos modelos de
regressão para estimar os efeitos de cada tipo em diversas atitudes, como apoio à democracia e confiança institucional. Resultados:
Nossos resultados mostram uma relação entre os tipos mais extremos de antipartidarismo e as atitudes em relação à democracia. Em
comparação com os eleitores não antipartidários, os antipartidários intolerantes apoiam menos a democracia e as instituições
democráticas e são menos favoráveis à liberdade de expressão e à concessão de direitos políticos às minorias. A intensidade do
antipartidarismo importa mais do que o seu alcance, pois os modelos mostram que, há pouca diferença no grau de compromisso com
a democracia e os princípios democráticos entre os dois tipos de antipartidários intolerantes, independentemente da abrangência do
alvo de sua reprovação. Isso significa que as atitudes em relação à democracia, às instituições democráticas e aos princípios
democráticos dependem menos da abrangência do alvo da desafeição do que da intolerância política em relação aos grupos.
Discussão: Os dados e resultados aqui apresentados indicam que o antipartidarismo não é um fenômeno unidimensional. O
indivíduo não é apenas antipartidário ou não antipartidário. Mostramos que o antipartidarismo contém pelo menos duas dimensões:
seu alcance e intensidade. Estudos anteriores já mostraram a existência de diferentes expressões de antipartidarismo, mas essa
diversidade ainda não foi explorada sistematicamente com uma tipologia bem definida. Nosso trabalho aponta para uma agenda de
pesquisas a partir dessa temática.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: antipartidarismo; tolerância política; atitudes políticas; partidos políticos; democracia.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License which permits
unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium provided the original work is properly cited.
A produção desse manuscrito foi viabilizada através do patrocínio fornecido pelo Centro Universitário Internacional Uninter à Revista de
Sociologia e Política.
Antipartisanship and political tolerance in Brazil 15/18
Appendix









Sex -0.17 0.18 -0.22 0.36* 0.21
(0.107) (0.218) (0.149) (0.159) (0.186)
Age bracket 0.22** -0.59*** -0.1 0.01 -0.05
(0.074) (0.15) (0.102) (0.107) (0.127)
Education 0.01 0.01 0 -0.05* 0.02
(0.015) 0.029 (0.021) (0.022) (0.026)
Intercept -0.72** 3.67*** 2.08*** 2.22*** 2.11***
(0.231) (0.481) (0.323) (0.335) (0.399)
Observations 1430 1430 1430 1430 1430
Source: Lapop, 2017.
Nota: *** < 0,000; ** < 0,01; * < 0,05.
Table 2A - Descriptive statistics of dependent variables
Median Mean Min-Máx
Support for Democracy 7.14 6.44 1.43/10
Support for the Political System 4.29 4.41 1.43/10
Institutional Confidence 3.22 3.73 1.43/10
Political tolerance of homosexuals 8 6.77 1/10
Support for the right to participate in demonstrations 8 7.01 1/10
Source: Lapop, 2017.














VIF Df VIF Df VIF Df VIF Df VIF Df
Antipart
isanship





1.07 1 1.07 1 1.01 1 - - 1 1
Sex 1.03 1 1.14 1 1.1 1 1.03 1 1.03 1
Age 1.10 1 1.03 1 1.10 1 1.1 1 1.10 1
Educa-
tion
1.18 1 1.10 1 1.09 1 1.18 1 1.18 1
Political
Interest
1.14 1 1.14 1 1.14 1 1.14 1 1.14 1
Source: Lapop, 2017.
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Source: Lapop, 2017.
Graph 1A - Marginal Effects – Support for Democracy
Source: Lapop, 2017.
Graph 2A - Marginal Effects – Support for the Political System
Source: Lapop, 2017.
Graph 3A - Marginal Effects – Institutional Confidence
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Source: Lapop, 2017.
Graph 4A - Marginal Effects – Political tolerance of homosexuals
Source: Lapop, 2017.
Graph 5A - Marginal Effects – Support for the right to participate in demonstrations
